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Abstract—Cooperative relaying is utilized as an efficient
method for data communication in wireless sensor networks and
Internet of Things (IoT). However, sometimes due to the necessity
of multi-hop relaying in such communication networks, it is
challenging to guarantee the secrecy of cooperative transmissions
when the relays may themselves be eavesdroppers, i.e., we may
face with the untrusted relaying scenario where the relays are
both necessary helpers and potential eavesdroppers. To obviate
this issue, a new cooperative jamming scheme is proposed in this
paper, in which the data can be confidentially communicated from
the source to the destination through multi-hop untrusted relays.
Toward this end, we first consider a two successive untrusted
relaying network, i.e, a three-hop communication network. In
our proposed secure transmission scheme, all the legitimate nodes
contribute to provide secure communication by smartly injecting
artificial noises to the network in different communication phases.
Given this system model, a novel closed-form expression is
presented in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime for the
ergodic secrecy rate (ESR). Furthermore, we evaluate the high
SNR slope and power offset of the ESR to gain a basic comparison
of the proposed secure transmission scheme and the state-of-
arts. Our numerical results highlight that the proposed secure
transmission scheme provides better secrecy rate compared with
the two-hop untrusted relaying scheme as well as the direct
transmission scheme.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Untrusted relay, Multi-
hop communication, Artificial noise injection.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
ECURITY in wireless communication networks is con-
ventionally implemented above the physical layer using
key based cryptography methods [1]. However, these methods
may not be applicable to emerging Internet of Things (IoT)
and ad-hoc networks. For instance, the time-varying network
topologies require complicated key management which is
difficult to implement in distributed networks. Additionally,
the computing and processing abilities of the nodes may be
limited and the complicated encryption calculations may not
be supported. To complement these complex schemes, wireless
transmitters can also be validated at the physical layer by
exploiting the dynamic characteristics of the associated com-
munication links [2]. To accomplish this idea, physical layer
security (PLS) has been emerged as a promising paradigm
for safeguarding 5G wireless communication networks without
incurring additional security overhead [2].
In the context of PLS, cooperative jamming which involves
the transmission of additional jamming signals to degrade the
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the potential eavesdrop-
per can be applied by any legitimate node of the network
[1]. Recently, several works have considered the interesting
scenario of untrusted relaying [3]–[7] where the cooperative
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jamming is performed by the intended receiver, which is
named as destination-based jamming technique.
In real world, an untrusted relay may be assisted to provide
a reliable communication. Several practical scenarios may in-
clude untrusted relay nodes, e.g., wireless sensor networks and
IoT where low-cost intermediate nodes may be exploited to as-
sist the source-to-destination transmission. In these networks,
it is important to protect the confidentiality of information
from the untrustworthy relay, while simultaneously exploiting
its relaying capability to improve the data transmission rate.
Thanks to the destination-based jamming strategy [3], positive
secrecy rate can still be attained in untrusted relay networks.
While the recent works [4]–[7] have focused on the simple
scenario of two-hop untrusted relaying, it is of great interest
to go beyond these investigations by considering secure com-
munication in larger networks such as ad-hoc networks and
IoT where more than two hops may be required to provide
the source to destination communication [8], [9]. Extending
the analysis from two-hop networks to multi-hop untrusted
relaying networks is non-trivial, because using more hops
means that more nodes are involved in the transmission as well
as more chances for eavesdropping. In addition, the number
of hops becomes a design parameter which affects on the end-
to-end delay and throughput.
In this paper, we take into account secure transmission in
a multi-hop amplify-and-forward untrusted relaying network
where all nodes have a single antenna. Each relay is considered
to be a mandatory helper and a potential eavesdropper. A
new artificial noise injection protocol is proposed to keep the
communication confidential from the internal eavesdroppers
for any number of hops. For the special case of three-hop
communication network, i.e., two successive untrusted relay-
ing, the proposed secure transmission scheme is as follows:
in the first phase, while the source transmits its confidential
message to the first relay, the second relay injects artificial
noise to confuse the first relay. In the second phase, when the
first relay forwards the received signal to the second relay, the
destination injects an artificial noise to disturb the signal at the
second relay. Finally, in the third phase, when the second relay
broadcasts its signal to the destination, the source sends an
artificial noise to confuse the first relay. For this system model,
we first derive a novel closed-form expression for the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) of three-hop untrusted relaying at the high
SNR regime. Furthermore, we characterize the high SNR slope
and power offset of the ESR to provide a fundamental compar-
ison of the proposed scheme. We then extend our scheme by
proposing a general multi-hop untrusted relaying transmission
scheme. Our numerical examples highlight that the proposed
three-hop relaying scheme outperforms the traditional two-hop
relaying and direct transmission schemes where low power IoT
devices are exploited.
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Fig. 1. System model of a three-hop secure wireless relaying network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND TRANSMISSION SCHEME
As illustrated in Fig. 1, a three-hop communication system
is studied where the source node, denoted by (S), sends the
information signal to the destination (D) with the help of
two consecutive relays, namely R1 and R2. The amplify-and-
forward relay nodes are assumed to be untrusted and hence,
they can overhear the transmitted information signal while
relaying. Besides, all the involving nodes are equipped with a
single antenna operating in half-duplex mode. We also assume
that the consecutive relays are necessary helpers to deliver
the information signal to the destination. This assumption is
valid when the network nodes experience a heavy shadowing,
or when the distance between terminals is large, or when
the nodes suffer from limited power resources. We consider
a time division duplex (TDD) system with channel reci-
procity. The complex Gaussian channel gains from S to R1,
R1 to R2 and R2 to D are denoted by g ∼ CN (0,mg),
h ∼ CN (0,mh) and f ∼ CN (0,mf ), respectively. We
consider block fading such that the channel coefficients vary
independently from one frame to another frame, but do not
change within one frame. To make the analysis tractable, we
consider the equal transmit power P by the nodes. We also
define γg
∆
= ρ|g|2, γh ∆= ρ|h|2, and γf ∆= ρ|f |2, where ρ = PN0
describes the transmit SNR per each node. Remarkably γg , γh
and γf have exponential distributions with means γ¯g = ρmg,
γ¯h = ρmg, and γ¯f = ρmg, respectively.
Without loss of generality, the power of additive white noise
at each receiver is considered to be N0. We also suppose
that the nodes are aware from the necessary channel state
informations (CSIs), by which the relays as well as the
destination can thoroughly cancel the self-interference term
from the received signal. Note that since this assumption
leads to the maximum probability of eavesdropping at the
relays, we are forced to design a more robust network against
eavesdropping attack.
The proposed scheme for source-destination secure com-
munication takes place in three phases as shown in Fig. 1. By
considering equal time duration for each phase, the proposed
protocol is as follows. In the first phase of communication,
by using superposition coding S transmits the information
signal to R1 and simultaneously, R2 jams the first untrusted
relay by transmitting the artificial noise, as demonstrated with
solid lines in the figure. During the next phase, as depicted
by dashed lines, R1 forwards a scaled version of the received
signal towards R2. Concurrently, D jams R2 via transmitting
a jamming signal to guarantee secrecy. Finally, in the third
phase, plotted by dotted lines, R2 amplifies and broadcasts the
received signal which can be further received by D and R1.
After self-interface cancellation at D, the information signal
can be extracted at D. Notably during the last time slot,
due to the fact that R1 can overhear the broadcasted signal
by R2, the node S is forced to emit a jamming to enhance
the confidentially of communication. As such, R1 may fail to
successfully eavesdrop.
Based on the above descriptions and after some ma-
nipulations, the exact signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratios
(SINRs) at R1 in the first phase, at R2, at R1 in the third
phase and at D are respectively, obtained as
γ
(1)
R1
=
γg
γh+1
, γR2=
γgγh
γgγf+γhγf+2γh+γg+γf+1
, (1)
γ
(3)
R1
=
γgγ
2
h
γ2h + γh(γg + 1)
2 + (γg + γh + 1)2(γf + 1)
. (2)
γD =
γgγhγf
3γhγf + 2γfγg + γgγh + 2γf + 2γh + γg + 1
, (3)
Under the high SNR assumption with γk ≫ 1 for k ∈
{g, h, f}, the above SINRs are respectively, simplified as
γ
(1)
R1
≈ γg
γh
, γR2 ≈
γgγh
γf (γg + γh)
, (4)
γ
(3)
R1
≈ γgγ
2
h
(γg + γh)2γf + 2γhγ2g
. (5)
γD ≈ γgγhγf
3γhγf + 2γfγg + γgγh
. (6)
Expressions in (4) and (5) reveal that the amount of infor-
mation leakage is saturated when the transmit SNR goes to
infinity. However, the received SINR at the legitimate receiver
is a monotonically increasing function on the transmit SNR.
As a result, the achievable ESR is increased as the transmit
SNR grows which is fundamentally different from the direct
transmission scheme [5].
Remark 1: As can be understood, in the proposed scheme,
when a node transmits the information signal in the line of
destination, the node which is near to the receiving untrusted
relay is forced to propagate artificial noise to confuse the
eavesdropping node. As a consequence, this proposed scheme
can be routinely extended to multi-hop untrusted relaying
where more than two untrusted relays cooperate to forward
a confidential message to the destination.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The ergodic secrecy rate (ESR), as a widely used secrecy
criteria in the literature, characterizes the rate below which
any average secure transmission rate can be obtained. In this
section, we proceed to derive a new closed-form expression
for the ESR of three-hop untrusted relaying.
Based on the definition, the instantaneous secrecy rate is
achieved by subtracting the eavesdropping channel capacity
3from the legitimate channel capacity [1]. As such, the instan-
taneous secrecy rate, Rs, for a three-hop relaying is given by
Rs =
[
ID −max{I(1)R1 , IR2 , I
(3)
R1
}
]+
, (7)
where IK =
1
3 log2(1 + γK) with K ∈ {R1, R2, D} and
[x]+ = max(x, 0). Notably the pre-log factor 13 is due to the
fact that one round of transmission is done during three phases.
Remark 2: It is worth noting that γR2 ≫ γ(3)R1 , which can
be readily concluded by comparing (4) and (5). Therefore, the
maximum information leakage of three-hop untrusted relaying
is simplified to γE
∆
= max {γ(1)R1 , γR2}.
The exact ESR expression of the proposed three-hop un-
trusted relaying is obtained by forming a multiple integral
expression which can be calculated numerically. To present
a new compact expression for the ESR, we first derive closed-
form expressions for the ergodic legitimate rate and the ergodic
eavesdropping rate and then, a tight lower-bound expression
is presented for the ESR performance.
Lemma 1. The lower-bound closed-form expression for the
ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is given by
R¯L =
1
3 ln 2
E
{
ln(1 + γD)
}
≥ 1
3 ln 2
ln
(
1 + exp
[
− 3Φ + ln(γ¯g γ¯hγ¯f )
− ln
{
3γ¯hγ¯f + 2γ¯f γ¯g + γ¯g γ¯h
}])
∆
= R¯LBL , (8)
where Φ ≈ 0.577215 is the Euler constant.
Proof: The proof can be done straightforwardly by consid-
ering the facts that: 1) the Jensen’s inequality can apply on
the concave function ln(1 + exp (x)) with respect to x and,
2) for the exponential r.v. X with the mean of mX , we have
E{ln(X)} = −Φ+ ln(mx) [10, Eq. (4.331.1)].
Lemma 2. The approximate closed-form expression for the
ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel is formulated as
R¯E =
1
3 ln 2
E
{
ln(1 + γE)
}
=
1
3 ln 2
(
P T1 + (1 − P) T2
)
,
(9)
where P = Pr{γ(1)R1 > γR2}, T1 = E
{
ln(1+γ
(1)
R1
)
}
and T2 =
E
{
ln(1 + γR2)
}
are formulated as closed-form expressions
in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The tight closed-form lower-bound expression
for the ESR performance of the proposed three-hop untrusted
relaying is given by
R¯LBs =
1
3 ln 2
[
R¯LBL − R¯E
]+
. (10)
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ERGODIC SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we obtain the asymptotic ESR expressions
when the transmit SNR of each node, ρ, goes to infinity by
deriving the high SNR slope S∞ in bits/s/Hz and the high
SNR power offset L∞ in 3 dB. These parameters are defined
respectively, as [7]
S∞ = lim
ρ→∞
R¯s
log2 ρ
and L∞ = lim
ρ→∞
(
log2 ρ−
R¯s
S∞
)
, (11)
Following the same steps as in [7], the high SNR slope and
power offset of the three-hop untrusted relaying is obtained as
S∞ =
1
3
, (12)
and
L∞ =
1
ln(2)
(
mh
mf +mh
B + mf
mf +mh
C +A
)
, (13)
where A = 3Φ − ln
(
mgmhmf
3mfmh+2mfmg+mgmh
)
,B =
mg(ln(mg)−ln(mh))
mg−mh and C = ln
(
mgmh+mfmh+mgmf
mf (mg+mh)
)
. Ex-
pression (12) highlights that the channel powers has no impact
on the ESR slope which is equal to the maximum multiplexing
gain of the network. Furthermore, different from the high SNR
slope, we find that the high SNR power offset in (13) is related
to the all channel powers. As such, by properly positioning the
relays between the source and destination, the high SNR power
offset can be reduced. Notably, a decrease in the power offset
corresponds to an increase in the ESR performance.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSION
In this part, we prepare some numerical curves to reveal
the accuracy of the presented closed-form expressions. Addi-
tionally, we compare the secrecy performance of the proposed
multi-hop relaying scheme with two competitive counterparts:
1) the two-hop communication scheme where only one relay is
selected for data transmission and the other relay is considered
as pure eavesdropper, and 2) the direct transmission where
the confidential information is forwarded to the destination
directly without assisting the relays. In this case, both the
relays are considered as pure eavesdroppers. The following
simulation parameters are adopted in Figs. 2 and 3. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that the
nodes S, D, R1 andR2 are placed on one-dimensional space
at positions −3, +3, −1 and +1, respectively. Additionally,
the distance-dependent path loss factor is n= 2.7.
Fig. 2 depicts the ESR performance versus the transmit SNR
ρ in dB for different secure transmission schemes. As can
be seen in this figure, our proposed lower expression for the
ESR in Proposition 1 agrees well with the exact ESR which
is evaluated numerically by substituting (10)–(12) into (16).
Furthermore, our asymptotic ESR performance in Section IV
well-approximates the exact ESR in the high SNR regime. As
observed from Fig. 2, the ESR curve corresponding to the
case when considering only the first term of the infinite series
(associated to the equivalent modified Bessel function of the
second kind and first order) is so close to the exact ESR curve.
To reveal the advantage of the proposed three-hop untrusted
relaying scheme, we compare the ESR performance of our
new scheme with two well-known transmission schemes, i.e.,
two-hop untrusted relaying and direct transmission, in Fig.
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Fig. 2. Validating the obtained expressions for the ESR performance.
3. Additionally, two network topologies is considered. In
Topology 1, we have the same network structure as considered
for Fig. 2, and for Topology 2, we have the scaled version of
Topology 1 with factor of 13 , i.e., the nodes S, D, R1 andR2 are located at -1, +1, − 13 and + 13 , respectively. Note that
under two-hop relaying scheme, we face with two cases. In
Case I, the relay R1 is employed for data retransmission and
the relay R2 is considered as pure eavesdropper. Whereas
in Case II, the converse scenario is considered. i.e., the relay
R2 is the helper node and R1 is considered as an idle eaves-
dropper. As observed in Fig. 3, the secrecy performance of the
proposed three-hope relaying scheme always outperforms the
two mentioned benchmarks for the transmit SNRs fewer than
25 dB (i.e., ρ < 25 dB). This result highlights the priority
of our scheme compared with the state-of-arts in untrusted
relaying networks. One can easily predict that the proposed
scheme under Topology 1 outperforms the two-hop relaying
schemes for ρ > 25 dB. Interestingly, under Topology 2 and
for ρ > 25 dB, the two-hop relaying scheme with Case I
provides better ESR compared with our scheme. The reason
is that when the communication nodes are close together
with much power budget, naturally, the two-hop relaying is
sufficient to data transmission and hence, it is not necessary to
implement multi-hop relaying scheme. Additionally, as proved
in [7], the high SNR slope for two-hop relaying is S∞ = 12
which is more than the high SNR slope of tree-hop relaying
scheme, S∞ = 13 , as we derived in (12). It is worth noting
that in IoT and wireless sensor networks, the devices are power
limited and thus, they cannot consume much power for data
transmission/retransmission. As a result, the proposed secure
three-hop relaying scheme in this paper is applicable for IoT
where low or medium transmit SNRs can be supported by the
devices. Finally, this figure depicts that the direct transmission
scheme presents a near to zero, but non-zero, secrecy rate. As
discussed in [7], even when the destination is very far from
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Fig. 3. ESR versus transmit SNR for different transmission schemes.
the source while the eavesdroppers locate between them, a
positive secrecy rate is achievable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this contribution, we designed a new secure transmission
scheme over multi-hop untrusted relaying networks. To this
end, we first studied a three-hop communication network with
two successive untrusted relays. Given this system model, a
novel closed-form expression was derived in the high SNR
regime for the ESR performance. We next evaluated the high
SNR slope and power offset of the ESR. We finally generalized
our system model to multi-hop untrusted relaying. Our numer-
ical results presented that the proposed secure transmission
scheme improves the secrecy performance compared with two-
hop relaying and direct transmission schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Before proving Lemma 2, we present the following neces-
sary Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let X and Y be exponential RVs with means
mx and my , respectively. Then the new RVs Z =
X
Y and
W = XYX+Y have the following cumulative distribution func-
tions (CDFs), respectively
FZ(z)=
myz
myz +mx
,
FW (w)=1− 2ω√
mxmy
exp
(
− ω
mx
− ω
my
)
K1
(
2ω√
mxmy
)
,
(14)
where Kν(·) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind
and ν-th order.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
In the following, we proceed to prove the different parts of
5A. Calculating P: Plugging (4) into P = Pr{γ(1)R1 > γR2},
and then defining X = γf , Y = γh and Z = γg, we get
P = Pr{γf > γ
2
h
γg + γh
} = 1− Pr{X < Y
2
Y + Z
}
= 1− EY {EZ{FX( y
2
y + z
)}}
=
1
mymz
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
exp(− y
2
(y + z)mx
− y
my
− z
mz
)dzdy
(a)
=
1
mymz
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
exp(− v
2
umx
− v
my
− u− v
mz
)dudv
(b)
=
√
4
mxmymz
∫ ∞
0
exp(−vmy −mz
mymz
)vK1
(√
2
mxmz
v
)
dv
(c)
=
√
mxmz
3/2
mz −my√mx√mz + 2mzmy
∞∑
n=1
n∑
i=1
Λ(1, n, i)i!
(
2mzmy
mz −my√mxmz + 2mzmy
)i
,
(d)≈ 8
√
mxmz
5/2my
3
(
mz −my√mx√mz + 2mzmy
)2 , (15)
where (a) follows from defining the auxiliary variables
u = y+z and v = y, (b) follows from using [10, Eq. (3.324.1)]
and [10, Eq. (3.351.3)], (c) follows from substituting the
infinite series equivalent modified Bessel function of the
second kind and first order as presented in [11], which is a
well-tight approximation with finite series, as observed later
in numerical results. For ν > 0 and positive integer M , we
have [11], Kν(βx) ≈ exp(−βx)
M∑
n=0
∑n
i=0 Λ(ν, n, i)(βx)
i−ν ,
where M → ∞ and Λ(ν, n, i) = (−1)i
√
piΓ(2ν)Γ(n−ν+ 1
2
)L(n,i)
2ν−iΓ( 1
2
−ν)Γ(n+ν+ 1
2
)n!
in which L(i, n) =
(
n−1
i−1
)
n!
i! for n, i > 0 represents the Lah
numbers. Finally, (d) presents the first term of the infinite
series given for M = 1 to have a closed-form approximation.
We will show in the simulation results how this simple
closed-form expression works well.
B. Calculating T1: Using Lemma 3, we can derive a closed-
form expression for T1, after assuming X =
γg
γh
, as
T1 = E
{
ln(1 +
γg
γh
)
}
=
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x) dx
=
∫ ∞
0
1− FX(x)
1 + x
dx =
mg ln(
mg
mh
)
mg −mh . (16)
C. Calculating T2: The part T2 can be mathematically
calculated as
T2 = E{ln(1 + γgγh
γf (γg + γh)
)} (a)≈ ln
(
1 +
E{ γgγhγg+γh }
E{γf}
)
(b)
= ln
(
1 +
mgmh
(
m2g −m2h − 2 ln mgmh
)
3mf (mg −mh)
)
, (17)
where (a) follows after using the approximation
E{log (1 + XY )} ≈ log(1 + E{X}E{Y }) [12] and (b) follows
from using Lemma 3 and MAPLE software.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The CDF of Z = XY has been derived in [5]. To obtain the
CDF of W = XYX+Y , we start from the definition of CDF as
FW (ω) = Pr
{ XY
X + Y
< ω
}
= Pr
{
XY − ω(X + Y ) < 0
}
= Pr
{
X <
ωY
Y − ω |Y − ω ≥ 0
}
Pr{Y − ω ≥ 0}
+ Pr
{
X ≥ ωY
Y − ω |Y − ω < 0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
Pr{Y − ω < 0}
=
∫ ∞
ω
FX
(
ωy
y − ω
)
fY (y)dy +
∫ ω
0
fY (y)dy
=
∫ ∞
ω
[
1− exp
(
− ωy
mx(y − ω)
)]
fY (y)dy+
∫ ω
0
fY (y)dy
=1− 1
my
∫ ∞
ω
exp
(
− ωy
mx(y − ω) −
y
my
)
dy
=1− 1
my
exp
(
− ω
mx
− ω
my
)∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− ω
2
mxy
− y
my
)
dy
(a)
=1− 2ω√
mxmy
exp
(
− ω
mx
− ω
my
)
K1
(
2ω√
mxmy
)
,
(18)
Finally, after calculating the integral term using [10, Eq.
(3.324.1)], one can obtain the expression given in (14).
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